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THE PRISONER AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
FREEDOM BEHIND BARS?
He [the convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not
only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those
which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time
being the slave of the State. 1
Abhorrent as these words now seem, they were actually spoken by a
court approximately one hundred years ago. Within the last century,
however, the development of prisoners' rights law reflects an evolution
-though not radical-undergone by society in its attitude toward the
incarcerated.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution 2 has traditionally enveloped the "preferred" freedoms 3 of all individuals.
Whether or not first amendment rights survive incarceration in various
sets of circumstances is a question which has been asked of many courts
over a period of several years.
When discussing the "imprisoned," it is necessary to be aware of
a dichotomy inherently existent in that term. Every incarcerated individual is not necessarily confined because he has been deemed guilty of
some act which society has decided does not conform to an acceptable
behavioral pattern; often a person is imprisoned simply because he
could not afford bail and, therefore, in order to assure his appearance
at trial, this unconvicted individual is forced to assume the same mode
of existence as one who has been adjudged guilty of a crime. As in
many other problem areas in our societal structure, the economically
oppressed finds the wall of discrimination confining him to an existence
which he often does not deserve and for which he has no means of re1. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;

or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). See also Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present
Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-andBeyond, 1969 Sup. CT. RaV. 41.
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dress if he is ultimately found "not guilty" of the crime for which he
was originally charged.
Thus, a discussion of whether or not-and, if so, to what degree
-the first amendment protects activities of the prisoner must necessarily distinguish between the convicted and the unconvicted prisoner.
It is interesting to note the wide variations of tests which various
courts have applied in their attempts to decide if a particular prisoner
in a certain set of circumstances should prevail in his quest for the right
of survival of some first amendment freedom. No less illuminating is
the rationale some courts have used in order to shift the burden of
making decisions to the prison administrative channels. Various state
legislatures and prison administrative systems have recently made efforts to effect changes in the operation and maintenance of the prison
structure.
RECENT LEGISLATIVE
PRISONERS'

RIGHTS

IN

AND
THE

ADMINISTRATIVE
FIRST

EFFORTS

AMENDMENT

CONCERNING

AREA

On August 23, 1972, the members of the Association of State Correctional Administrators met in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and at that
meeting adopted a set of Policy Guidelines to be utilized in the prison
system. The Guidelines for access to media and mail are especially
relevant to a discussion of prisoners' first amendment freedoms. Considering the extensive litigation in these two areas, they perhaps constitute the most controversial subjects of prisoner rights at the present
time.
The Guidelines for mail initially state:
Correspondence with members of an inmate's family, close
friends, associates, and organizations is beneficial to the morale of
all confined persons and may form the basis for good adjustment
4
in the institution and in the community.
After espousing this benevolent point of view, however, the Guidelines
then go on to set out several limitations on the prisoners' correspondence.
The Guidelines divide mail into two categories: (1) mail to and
from a specified class of persons and organizations' and (2) general
4. Association of State Correctional Administrators Policy Guidelines: Mail
(1972).
5. The following individuals should be included in the specified class of persons

and organizations:

(1) judges of federal, state and local courts; (2) officials of the

confining authority; and (3) members of the paroling authority. Id.
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correspondence.8 Mail to persons in the specified class should not be
opened; mail from these persons may be opened only for inspection of
contraband. 7 However, all general correspondence, both incoming and
outgoing, is subject to inspection.a "The criteria for approval of persons for general correspondence should be limited to the purposes of
confinement and security of the institution."9
Another correspondence area concerns what type of publications the
inmates should be allowed to receive via the mails. The Guidelines indicate that any publication may be restricted if it constitutes a danger of
a breach of prison discipline or security, or substantial interference with
the maintenance of order at the institution.10
In general, the Guidelines state that the media should have access to
correctional operations, except where such access would interfere with
the orderly administration of the prison."
The Guidelines for media
access indicate that inmates should be allowed to correspond with media representatives in the same manner as with anyone else on the general correspondence list.' 2 Restrictions on this mail may only be imposed if the correspondence "endangers the security of the institution or
impedes the orderly operation of the institution."'"
Thus, under the guise of maintaining the "security" or "orderly operation" of the institution, the prison officials have the power to eliminate any general correspondence or media access they desire; only correspondence with persons in the "specified class" seems to be an absolute
6. The Guidelines set out who should be approved as potential members of the
prisoner's general correspondence list: "In general, all close relatives should be approved, anyone having legitimate business with the inmate may be approved, cor-

respondence should not be limited solely on the basis of sex, existence of a criminal

record should not, in and of itself, constitute a barrier to correspondence, and juveniles
under the age of 18 years should have permission from parents before correspondence
is allowed. Other correspondents may be permitted at the discretion of the institutional head." Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The full text states: "PUBLICATIONS: Institutions should allow inmates access to publications to the greatest degree consistent with institutional goals, internal
discipline and security. Publications should be received by inmates only from the
publisher or distributor. In addition, institutions may subscribe to publications in suf-

ficient quantity to give coverage in the institution and to provide for the diverse interests of the inmate population. No publication should be prohibited solely on the basis
of its appeal to a particular ethnic, racial or religious audience. As a general rule,

however, institutions may restrict receipt of publications that constitute a danger of
breach of prison discipline or security, or some other substantial interference with the
orderly administration of the institutions."

11.
Media
12.
13.

Id.

Association of State Correctional Administrators Policy Guidelines: Access to
(1972).
Id.
Id.
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right. Under scrutiny, the Guidelines appear far from adequate as a
safeguard of the prisoners' first amendment rights.
Some legislation has also attempted to outline the rights of the prisoner. However, the following study of the legislative efforts made in
some states reveals that the legislation suffers from the same infirmities
as the administrative Guidelines, i.e., the legislation is stated in such
broad terms that much discretion is still vested in the prison authorities.
Under the new Illinois Unified Code of Corrections, for the ostensible reasons of security, safety or morale of the institution, the prison administration can limit to whatever extent it deems necessary the prisoners' rights to the use of the mails. 4 Due to the lack of specificity in the
Illinois Code, the mail provision proves inadequate as a meaningful regulation. The vagueness of the Code prevents a useful application in a
particular set of circumstances.
The State of New York, in its Department of Correction Code, indicates that, except for correspondence designated as "special correspondence,"' 15 all incoming and outgoing correspondence may be read by jail
personnel "to protect the safety and security of the facility and the welfare and best interests of the prisoners.' 16 The Second Circuit recently
held that these mail regulations were constitutional.17 The court felt
that since the new regulations permit censorship (by non-mailing) only
in the case of a "clear and present danger" to the security of the facility, this delineation balances the conflicting interests appropriately."
However, it seems that the "chilling effect"'19 presented by the officials'
14.

The legislation reads as follows: "All institutions and facilities of the Depart-

ment shall permit every committed person to send and receive an unlimited number of

uncensored letters, provided, however, that the Director may order that mail be inspected and read for reasons of the security, safety or morale of the institution or facility. Each week, the Department shall provide to every committed person postage

for at least 3 first-class letters weighing one ounce or less."

ILL. REv.

STAT.

ch. 38

§ 1003-7-2(d) (Effective January 1, 1973).
15. "Special correspondence" includes correspondence to U.S. President, Governor of
New York State, member of New York State Legislature, the New York State Commission of Correction, the Chairman of the New York State Parole Board, and to any
attorney or any court. CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Title 7 CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, § 5100.10(e)(6) (1972).

16. CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Title 7 CORFor the complete administrative proceRECTIONAL SERVICES, § 5100.10(e) (1972).
dures, see CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Title 7 CoRSee also CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
RECTIONAL SERVICES, § 5100.10 (1972).
THE STATE OF NEW YORK,Title 7 CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, § 59 (1972), for legislation
regarding the free exercise of religion.
17. Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1972). This case involved an
unconvicted prisoner.
18. Id. at 672.
19. For a good discussion of the "chilling effect," see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380

U.S. 479, 487-89 (1965).
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reading of all incoming and outgoing mail (except for the "special correspondence") presents a substantial constitutional question. As in the
Illinois Code, the New York legislation has not eliminated the wide discretion vested in prison officials to limit rights in order to insure the security of the penal institution.
POLICY OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION WHEN FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS OF PRISONERS

ARE SCRUTINIZED

The previous examination of some legislative and administrative efforts in the area of first amendment rights of the incarcerated reveals
that, by no means, have these efforts obviated the need for court intervention in the future if the constitutional rights of the imprisoned are to
be secured. The prisoner seeking relief for an alleged deprivation of
his first amendment rights must, before the merits of his case will be
reached, contend with the judicial laissez faire attitude regarding litigation of prisoner rights. This problem is not as crucial for the prisoner
as it once was since recent litigation indicates a somewhat more benevolent judicial attitude toward the imprisoned and their rights.
Courts have used various rationales in an effort to refrain from interfering in the prisoner rights area. One court said that although a
prisoner may not approve of prison rules, under ordinary circumstances
his disapproval is not a basis for seeking relief in a federal court even
though the prisoner alleges that the limitations placed upon him can be
equated to a violation of his constitutional rights.2 0 The Sixth Circuit
indicated that prison authorities have the right to adopt reasonable restrictions on the conduct of prison inmates and courts should not interfere unless there is actual constitutional deprivation.2 The "hands off"
policy in matters of prison administration has been exhibited by the
Tenth Circuit's statement that the basic responsibility for the control
and management of penal institutions lies with the responsible administrative agency; judicial review is not necessary unless the institution is
managed in such a manner as to amount to caprice or clear abuse by
the prison officials. 2 Thus, it has been held that prison authorities are
permitted wide discretion in matters of internal prison administration,
and reasonable action within the ambit of this discretion does not constitute an infringement of a prisoner's constitutional rights.2
20.

United States v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294, 295 (7th Cir. 1954).

21. Vida v. Cage, 385 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1967).
22. E.g., Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1969); Paniagua v.
Moseley, 451 F.2d 228, 230 (10th Cir. 1971).
23. Smith v. Schneckloth, 414 F.2d 680, 681 (9th Cir. 1969).
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In 1969 the decision in Brown v. Wainwright24 indicates how far a
court will go in maintaining its "hands off" policy. Brown was an action by a state prisoner brought under the Civil Rights Act, i.e., 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter referred to as "Section 1983"1),25' in which
a request was made to enjoin prison mail censors from removing postage stamps from the prisoner's outgoing mail. The Fifth Circuit, in affirming the lower court's dismissal of the action, held that the claim did
not rise to the level of a federal claim, and, if considered only as a
property theft problem, no basis was indicated for the prisoner to main26
tain a civil rights action!
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's announcement of its new
standard in Cruz v. Beto27 it had been stated that courts will not interfere in prison administration absent an abuse of the wide discretion
permitted prison officials to maintain order and discipline 28 or absent
an extreme case. 29 The Second Circuit expressed an even stricter
standard, stating that the federal courts should not interfere with internal state prison administration except in the most extreme cases
which involve a shocking deprivation of fundamental rights.3 0
On the positive side for the complaining prisoner, however, even the
Fifth Circuit, which previously had said that there should not be judicial interference absent an abuse of the wide discretion permitted prison authorities, 3 has also held that "interference with federally guaranteed rights may not be insulated on the basis that everything which oc'32
curs within prison walls is protected as prison administration.
The United States Supreme Court in Cruz v. Beto33 has recently announced the standard on judicial intervention in prisoner rights cases.
Cruz involved a class action under Section 1983 by prison inmates
who alleged deprivation of their constitutional rights. Their complaint
alleged violations of first amendment rights to freedom of religion, to
court access, and to stay informed on the status of local and national
24. 419 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1969).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) is as follows: "Every person who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
26. Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1969).
27. 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
28. Royal v.Clark, 447 F.2d 501, 501-02 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. Rhodes v. Sigler, 448 F.2d 1237, 1238 (8th Cir. 1971).
30. Baldwin v. Smith, 446 F.2d 1043, 1044 (2d Cir. 1971).
31. Royal v. Clark, 447 F.2d 501, 501-02 (5th Cir. 1971).
32. Rocha v. Beto, 449 F.2d 741, 742 (5th Cir. 1971).
33. 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
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affairs by being denied access to radio, television, newspapers and
magazines during the times they were disciplined by solitary confinement. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint without discussing the issues involved.
In a per curiam decision the United States Supreme Court vacated
the judgment and remanded the cause for a hearing and appropriate
findings. In response to the district court's denial of relief on the
ground that the area should be left to the prison administration's discretion, the Court said: "Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to
enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' which include prisoners."

34

The Cruz decision will perhaps somewhat mitigate the chaos35 in
which the courts apparently have found themselves when trying to decide whether to interfere in prisoner-initiated complaints. Whatever
problems face the courts in the future, it appears that the Cruz rationale will at least make it easier for the judiciary, once it determines a
constitutional right is possibly being infringed, to determine that its intervention is warranted. It would seem that the exercise of court jurisdiction need no longer be "sparing" or only in an "extreme" case or one
involving a "shocking deprivation" of basic rights, but rather, if the
prisoner's complaint indicates the deprivation of a constitutional right,
the court should hear the case.
TESTS GENERALLY APPLICABLE IN FIRST AMENDMENT LITIGATION

In the past several years whenever the courts have been faced with
the question of whether or not an individual's first amendment rights
have been violated, a judicial resolution of this situation has involved
the application of some sort of test, e.g., "clear and present danger,"
balancing, etc."6 A cursory study of the application of these first
amendment tests when the non-prisoner is the complainant can perhaps
34. Id. at 321.
35. A capsulized version of this "chaos" can perhaps best be illustrated by the
court's statement in Sawyer v. Sigler, 445 F.2d 818, 819 (8th Cir. 1971): ". . . [We
wish to emphasize our frequently expressed view that the federal courts, whether in
habeas corpus or in section 1983 contexts, should not be unduly hospitable forums for
the complaints of either State or federal convicts; it is not the function of the courts to
run the prisons, or to undertake to supervise the day-to-day treatment and disciplining
of individual inmates; much must be left to the discretion and good faith of prison administrators. That is not to say, of course, that the federal courts should not exercise
their jurisdiction in proper cases, but the exercise of it should be sparing."
36. For an extensive discussion of the history of the "clear and present danger" test
and itsoffspring, see Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From
Schenck to Brandenburg-andBeyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
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shed some light on what type of reasoning the courts will--or shouldutilize when the incarcerated is seeking his constitutional rights.
The test which the courts generally in the past have deemed appropriate is the "clear and present danger" test. This test found its genesis in Schenck v. United States.a7 In Schenck the Court said:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree.38
However, approximately thirty years later, when the Supreme Court
attempted to resolve the question presented by Dennis v. United
States,3 9 the "clear and present danger" test was distorted in such a
manner that its application in the first amendment area virtually had
lost its vitality. It was the Court's attempt in Dennis to decide what the
"clear and present danger" test actually meant that ultimately resulted
in its demise. In that case the Court decided that protection from
overthrow of the government by force is a substantial enough interest to
justify a restriction on speech." In essence, the "clear and present danger" test was rejected in favor of some sort of balancing technique;
however, instead of indicating that it was balancing, the Court merely
imported a different meaning to the "clear and present danger" ration41
ale.
Thus, the balancing techniques42 came into vogue, clearly spelling
the death of any strict construction-if, indeed, any construction at
all--of the "clear and present danger" test. The balancing tests proved
to be anathema to any litigant propounding first amendment deprivations since under the scheme of balancing, any governmental interest
could be deemed "substantial enough" to warrant the restriction of an
individual's constitutional rights in a given situation. As in Dennis, no
37. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
38. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
39. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
40. Id. at 509.
41. The Court used the words: "Obviously, the words [clear and present danger]
cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is
about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited ....
Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force, even though doomed from the
outset because of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil
for Congress to prevent." Id.
42. For a good discussion of the various types of balancing tests, see Strong, Fifty
Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond,

1969 Sup. CT. REv. 41.
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actual danger had to be present-just a substantial governmental interest.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio4 the Supreme Court seized upon an opportunity to develop a test defining the present concept of what type of examination an alleged first amendment right has to pass in order to survive
judicial scrutiny. In striking down Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act,4 4
the Court said that this statute purporting "to punish mere advocacy
and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others
merely to advocate the described type of action" falls within the condemnation of both the first and fourteenth amendments.4"
It appears that the Brandenburg test would permit a state to forbid
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation only where such advocacy is directed to, and is likely to, incite or produce imminent lawless action.46 The Court recently used this test in Cohen v. California
where it stated that an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" is not enough to overcome an individual's right to freedom
of expression.4 7 Thus, the Brandenburg "imminent lawless action"
test is much more protective of first amendment interests than the distorted "clear and present danger" test of Dennis, and it is probably
what Justices Holmes and Brandeis had meant to be the interpretation
of their original test.
Apparently, the courts at the present time are willing to render to a
complaining non-prisoner the full range of his first amendment rights,
subject only to the "imminent lawless action" restriction. However,
what does the Brandenburgtest hold for the plaintiff who is imprisoned,
either in a convicted or unconvicted status? Will the very setting of
confinement have an influence on whether or not the courts will determine if the "imminent lawless action" test is applicable?
Before examining the substantive tests the courts apply in the prisoner rights area, it seems proper to consider the procedural aspects of
initiating litigation when the protection of the Constitution is sought.
43. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
44. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13 (1954). The Act punished persons who (1)
advocated or taught the duty, necessity, or propriety of violence as a means of accomplishing reform; (2) published or circulated or displayed any publication containing such
advocacy; (3) justified the commission of violent acts with the intent to advocate the
propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism; or (4) voluntarily assembled with a
group which had the purpose to advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. Id.

at 448.
45.
46.
47.

395 U.S. at 449.
Id. at 447.
403 U.S. 15, 23, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).

Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).

See also Tinker v.
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PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF BRINGING PRISONER FIRST

AMENDMENT

ACTIONS

When a prisoner believes that his first amendment rights are infringed in the prison environment, he has the choice of two common
methods of proceeding in the federal court: (1) federal habeas corpus;48 or (2) Section 1983. 49 State prisoners who apply for federal
habeas corpus relief must demonstrate that they have exhausted state
judicial remedies.5" It has been implied that a court will look at a
Section 1983 action and, under some circumstances, it may treat such
action as a petition for habeas corpus. 5
It is generally preferable for the prisoner to proceed via a Section
1983 action rather than by a petition for habeas corpus. 52 Unlike a
habeas corpus petition, a Section 1983 action does not require exhaustion of state legal or equitable remedies before its commencement. 3
Jurisdiction is granted to the federal district courts in Section 1983
cases by 28 U.S.C. § 134354 which does not require diversity of citizenship or an allegation of a jurisdictional amount. 55
The Tenth Circuit outlined the purpose of Section 1983; and the
court's delineation of the aims of Section 1983 seems to illustrate properly the rationale behind, and the need for, that Section:
. . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for persons who are
deprived of any rights secured by the Constitution, under color of
any state or territorial statute, ordinances, regulations, custom or
usage. The purpose of this section is to override certain kinds of
48. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (Supp. III. 1965-67) and 2255 (1964).
49. The United States Supreme Court will review Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d
79 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted sub nom. Oswald v. Rodriguez 407 U.S. 919 (1972),
and the question presented is whether the prisoner should be allowed the option of challenging the condition of his confinement by means of a Section 1983 action despite the
purported existence of an appropriate remedy by means of habeas corpus.
50.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c) (Sunp. III, 1965-67).

51. Gaito v. Strauss, 368 F.2d 787, 788 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977
(1967).
52. 1 PRISONERS' RIGHTS NEWSLETTER 21 (1971). See also Turner, Establishing the
Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners'Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV.

473, 504-06 (1970-71), for an extensive discussion of habeas corpus and Section 1983
actions.
53. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied
sub nom. Sostre v. Oswald, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v.
Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1972).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964), in pertinent part: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . . (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights
of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ......
55. E.g., Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 940 (1955).
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state and local laws, and to provide a federal remedy where the
state remedy was inadequate in theory or practice. 56
Section 1983 protects rights secured by the Constitution and statutes
of the United States.57 Persons who are confined in state prisons are
within the protection of Section 1983.58 Similar to federal habeas corpus, a Section 1983 complaint must indicate specific conduct by state
officials which violates some right of the complainant before a claim
for relief is properly stated. 19
Although a Section 1983 action does not require exhaustion of state
remedies, it does demand of the complainant that he seek to obtain relief through the proper administrative channels before approaching the
courts for a remedy. 60 It is the duty of the district court to determine
whether the inmate has actually exhausted his administrative reme61
dies.
Although a petition is presented to the court as a habeas corpus action, it may be read by the judiciary to plead a cause of action under
Section 1983.62 In Wilwording v. Swenson the United States Supreme
Court stated that state prisoners are not held to any stricter standard
63
of exhaustion than other civil rights complainants.
GENERAL COURT ATTITUDE TOWARDS

THE IMPRISONED

Various judicial attitudes have been expressed toward the prisoner
and his rights. One attitude, as expressed in Price v. Johnston, indicated that lawful incarceration necessitates the withdrawal or limitation
of many rights, a retraction purportedly justified by the considerations
underlying the penal system.6 4 However, it has been said that a prisoner does not lose all of his rights.65 Coffin v. Reichard evidenced another attitude when it indicated that a prisoner is said to retain all the
rights which an ordinary citizen enjoys except those which are taken
56. Elkanich v. Alexander, 430 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir.), aff'g 315 F. Supp. 659, 661
(D. Kan. 1970).
57. E.g., Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 315 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 920, rehearingdenied, 376 U.S. 959 (1964).
58. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 368 F.2d 992, 993 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 868
(1966).
59. E.g., Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 3 (3rd Cir. 1970).
60. E.g., Paden v. United States, 430 F.2d 882, 883 (5th Cir. 1970); Rocha v.
Beto, 449 F.2d 741, 742 (5th Cir. 1971).
61. Tarlton v. United States, 429 F.2d 1297, 1298 (5th Cir. 1970).
62. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971).
63. Id.
64. 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
65. E.g., Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428, 431 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 988
(1966). For a general survey of prisoners' rights, see Feldman, The Legal Rights of
Prisoners, 53 CHICAGO B. RECoRD 273 (1972).
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from him by law, either expressly or by necessary implication.6 6 The
court in Coffin went on to say that the courts will be diligent in finding
a way to protect the substantial rights of an individual. 67
Apparently, the First Circuit felt that prison inmates may hold
some constitutional rights in diluted form. 68 The Fifth- Circuit's rationale for this dilution is the attitude that inherent administrative problems necessitate the withdrawal of many of the prisoner's rights and
privileges.6 9 Unfortunately, so long as incarceration as a punitive form
exists, the Third Circuit felt that the objective of imprisonment is to
circumscribe some of the activities which are characteristic of an open
70
societal setting.
Thus, when a prisoner petitions a court for a redress of his grievances, once the court decides to hear the case, the prisoner will probably be confronted with the judicial attitude that, in essence, his rights
may be limited because he is confined. An examination of various decisions will reflect why this attitude exists and also the tests used in determining whether the limitation on the prisoner's rights is justified.
THE PRISONER AND THE FIRST

AMENDMENT

Although it is clear that an individual, upon incarceration, may be
subjected to the limitation of some of his rights, it is also apparent that
a prisoner does not forfeit his first amendment rights upon entrance into the prison.7 ' Courts have a propensity to scrutinize administrative
action involving a deprivation of the "preferred" freedoms encompassed
by the first amendment. 72 The court in Jackson v. Godwin indicated
that stringent standards are to be applied to governmental restrictions,
"and rigid scrutiny must be brought to bear on the justifications for en'73
croachments on such rights.
It has been said that there are state interests which justify repression
or restriction of first amendment rights beyond those interests which
could possibly justify limitations upon citizens who are not incarcerated.7 4 Brown v. Peyton went on to set out some state interests. It indicated that prison officials have the duty to protect the public at large,
66.
67.

143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
Id.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1968).
Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 3-4 (3rd Cir. 1970).
E.g., Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1230 (4th Cir. 1971).
E.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 24 (5th Cir. 1969).
400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968).
Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971).

68.
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Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 551 (lst Cir. 1970).
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prison employees, and also other inmates, who are almost totally dependent on the prison for their well-being. Prison authorities may legitimately restrict freedoms in an attempt to further the interest in prisoner rehabilitation. Many restrictions on first amendment rights have
supposedly been justifiable as part of the punitive regimen of a prison;
for example, confinement itself limits communication with the outside
world but is permissible in order to punish and deter crime; additional
restrictions may be imposed as a means of punishing misbehavior of the
inmate inside the prison. Also, the state is interested in reducing the
burden and expense of administration. The state may place reasonable
limits on the number of publications received by each prisoner in an attempt to limit the onus of examining incoming materials. However,
the Brown court emphasized that these state interests do not eliminate
the necessity for a state to prove that they exist in a particular set of circumstances. 75
Is the Brown approach of determining whether a first amendment
right may be limited by the existence of a state interest adequate in the
prison situation? Where a first amendment interest is involved, it
seems that the Brown finding of state interests may not be appropriate
because it seems to put too much emphasis on the punitive aspects of
the prison situation and not enough on the rehabilitative element.
A brief discussion of some of the developments in the law concerning certain first amendment rights is indicative of what some courts apparently feel is the proper method of determining prisoner rights.
Mail Correspondence,Court Access, Redress of Grievances
Although it has been said that " . . . the use of the mails is almost
,I
as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues, ....
a judicial determination has also been made that a prisoner has no right
to unlimited freedom in the receipt and transmission of mail.77 Correspondence sent to public officials in an attempt to seek a redress of
alleged grievances is protected under the first amendment clause which
protects the right to petition for redress of grievances. 78 In California
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, the United States Supreme
Court recently said, "Certainly the right to petition extends to all de75.
76.

Id.
Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921)

(Holmes, J., Dissenting). Quoted in Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971), and
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965).
77. Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1952).
78. E.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 786 (D. R.I. 1970).
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partments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is in'79
deed but one aspect of the right of petition.
Where the inmate's complaint states a deprivation of his right to access to the courts by a refusal to mail a letter, censorship of same, etc.,
the courts have no problem in finding a constitutional deprivation. A
state prison inmate has a right of access to the courts80 and prison officials cannot deny court access to prisoners in their charge8 1 since the
Constitution forbids this denial to the incarcerated."'
In an action by a state prisoner seeking relief for claimed violations
of his constitutional rights by prison authorities, the prisoner charged
that he had been denied access to the courts by the officials' refusal to
mail his letter to the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union seeking advice and assistance on his due process claims.8
The First Circuit felt
that an inmate's right of access to the court involved a corollary right to
obtain assistance in preparing the prisoner's communication with the
court. Given that right, the court held that, absent a countervailing interest not evident in the case, the state could not prevent the inmate
from seeking legal assistance from bona fide attorneys working in the
Civil Liberties Union.84 This decision, however, contains the implication that if a "countervailing interest" could be found, the prisoner
would be denied relief, thus prompting the conclusion that the prisoner's right to court access and a redress of his grievances is not absolute
and apparently is subject to a balancing test.
Once it is determined that the correspondence between the prisoner
and his attorney, the courts, or state officials is not strictly in regard to
the legality of the prisoner's conviction or the conditions of his incarceration, the Tenth Circuit recently seemed to have a difficult time in
finding the correspondence to be constitutionally protected.8 5 Evans v.
Moseley involved allegations by a state prisoner that his constitutional
rights were being denied. One of the issues involved was whether the
prisoner Evans had a constitutional right to write an attorney. Evans,
attempting to establish a chapter of the Black United Front, wrote a
letter to an attorney who himself was apparently a Black United Front
member seeking the attorney's assistance in organizing the chapter. In
79. 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
80. E.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
81. E.g., Haines v. Castle, 226 F.2d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1014 (1956).
82. E.g., Jenks v. Henys, 378 F.2d 334, 335 (9th Cir. 1967).
83. Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 549 (lst Cir. 1970).

84.

Id. at 551.

85.

Evans v. Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir. 1972).
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holding that Evans did not possess a right to have the letter mailed, the
court explained that although a prisoner does have a right to correspond with his attorney, or the courts, or appropriate state officials, regarding the legality of his conviction or the condition of his incarceration, this right does not include the right to correspond with his attorney
on any subject. Since Evans' correspondence was about another matter, and also a matter concerning an organization which the prison officials did not want, this correspondence was not constitutionally pro86
tected.
Thus, the Evans court, denying that the prisoner had a constitutional
right to have his letter mailed to the attorney, felt that the controversy
was governed by the general rule that the regulation of mail from a penal institution is essentially an administrative matter for the prison officials and, therefore, not subject to judicial review except under the
most unusual circumstances. 87 What is unusual about Evans is that
the court did not feel it was necessary to discuss in any depth the constitutional implications. The court merely referred to LeVier v. Woodson,88 wherein was recognized a narrow exception to the general rule
that the regulation of mail is essentially an administrative matter. The
narrow exception in LeVier was that the prisoner had a right to correspond with his attorney, or the courts, or appropriate state officials regarding the legality of his conviction or the condition of his incarceration.89 The Evans court felt this exception was not broad enough to
include the right of a prisoner to correspond with an attorney on any
subject. 90
The Fourth Circuit in McDonough v. Director of Patuxent determined that if the purpose of an inmate's correspondence with a national
magazine, its legal representatives, a psychiatrist, and the prisoner's local attorney was to receive psychiatric, financial and legal assistance, he
would be entitled to relief from a ban and restrictions on this correspondence."
However, if the purpose of the correspondence was to
effect publication of a critique of the defective delinquency law and its
implementation at the institution, the institution had the authority to
suppress the correspondence. 9 2 The McDonough court engaged in
mere speculation and stated that such publication, being critical of the
86. Id. at 1086-87.
87. Id. at 1087.
88. 443 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1971).
89. Id. at 361.

90.

Evans v. Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir. 1972).

91.

429 F.2d 1189, 1193 (4th Cir. 1970).

92.

Id.
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institution, might adversely affect institutional control and discipline
since word of the criticism would certainly reenter the institution and
reach other inmates.9"
The First Circuit's response to the McDonough situation was enunciated in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, a prisoner action challenging the constitutionality of the prison's ban on letters by the prisoners to news media.9 4 The prisoners were not challenging the prison authorities' right to
read all letters to the press and to inspect them for contraband or escape plans. They were also not propounding a right to correspond
with the news media about matters of public policy or personal affairs
which were not prison-related. The issue which they were raising was
the right to send to the media letters concerning prison management,
offender treatment, and personal grievances they had in the prison.9 5
In holding that the prisoner retains the right to send letters to the
press with regard to prison matters, the First Circuit refrained from
adopting the broad principle that, upon incarceration, a prisoner retains
all first amendment rights.9" The court applied a balancing test in determining whether state interests unrelated to the suppression of speech
justified the ban imposed on these prisoners. Under this test the state
had the burden of establishing that the regulation furthered a substantial governmental interest and that the restriction on the prisoners' mail
97
was essential to the furtherance of that state interest.
In considering whether the state's interest in retaining prison security
and good order justified the restriction on the prisoners' mail, and also
whether prison restrictions under the circumstances actually constituted
a "prior to a prior restraint" (since expression would be cut off even
before the tension between free expression and order is present), the
court declared:
The most that can reasonably be said is that, depending upon
conditions in the prison when the letter or news story based on it
returns to the prison, some particularly inflammatory letters may
create a "clear and present danger" of violence or breach of security. In that extreme case, prison officials can cope with the
situation by refusing to admit the dangerous issue of the newspaper to the prison rather than by refusing to mail the letter in the
first instance. The rule against mailing is constitutionally infirm
93. id.
94. 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
95. Id. at 546.
96. Id. at 547.
97. Id. at 548. The court used the test which the United States Supreme Court
utilized in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, rehearing denied, 393 U.S.
900 (1968).
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in that it permits officials to withhold letters from the mails on the
basis of speculation as to what conditions in the prison will be
when and if the letter or article derived from it returns. 98
In essence, the Nolan court applied a "clear and present danger" test
in determining whether the prisoners' interest in corresponding survived
the state's interest in furthering the security of the prison institution.
Nolan went much further than McDonough in protecting the prisoners' first amendment rights by holding that it is not enough that the
mail "might adversely" affect institutional control, but rather the correspondence must actually represent a "clear and present danger" of, for
example, a breach of security, before a restriction on the prisoners' right
is allowed.
Somewhat akin to the Nolan rationale, the Second Circuit in Corby
v. Conboy,9 9 when faced with a prisoner's complaint of interference by
prison officials with his access to the courts, denial of medical treatment and censorship of his outgoing mail, stated that, unlike correspondence with courts or counsel, a prisoner's right to mail letters to his
family or friends is not absolute. The court stated that the prison officials' refusal to mail a letter must be clearly justified, for example,
where communication of its contents to persons outside the prison
would pose a threat to prison discipline or security or would impede efforts at inmate rehabilitation. 0 0 The Corby court hinted at the use of
a "clear and present danger" test in a situation of this type when it
talked about a refusal to mail a letter being justified if it could be
equated to a threat to prison discipline or security. However, the court
determined that another justification would be a hindrance of efforts to
rehabilitate the inmate, indicating that there is a reluctance to take from
the prison officials their discretion to censor mail whenever it is decided
that censorship may assist in the prisoner's rehabilitation.
Following the Nolan (and, to a degree, Corby) rationale, it would
appear to be very difficult for any court to decide that outgoing mail is
subject to censorship on the basis that it constitutes a "clear and present
danger" to prison security. As Nolan illustrated, the "danger" would
not appear until the result of the outgoing correspondence found its
way back into the prison. Thus, incoming communication would be
more prone to fail the "clear and present danger" test than would outgoing mail since almost any restraint on outgoing mail would consti98. 451 F.2d 545, 549 (lst Cir. 1971).
99. 457 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972). The Second Circuit reversed and remanded
Corby, stating that an adequate Section 1983 claim was made out by the prisoner.
100. Id. at 254.
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tute a prior restraint' 01 on the prisoner's first amendment freedoms.
A recent First Circuit decision, Smith v. Robbins, was concerned
with censorship by prison authorities of prisoner mail to and from
courts and attorneys. 0 2 The district court's order entitled the prisoner
to be present when prison officials open incoming mail from the prisoner's attorney in order to inspect for contraband. On appeal, the prisoner sought to have the order modified to bar the prison officials from
opening attorneys' letters at all unless they have reason to suspect that
the letters contain contraband. The First Circuit rejected this argument and declared that if the prisoner is present, he has the ability to
determine that the letter is not being read, and that is sufficient.' 01
Thus, in the attorney-client correspondence area the court not only assured the prisoner that he would receive all incoming mail from his attorney, but, by allowing the prisoner to be present when the mail was
opened, the court made certain that the prisoner's right would not suffer from a possible "chilling effect" created by the fear that the prison officials might read the incoming mail.
Whether this precedent in favor of prisoners' rights in the area of
attorney-client mail will be universally followed is a question which is
difficult to answer. When the Second Circuit was recently given the
opportunity to rely on Smith, it expressed the desirability of the Smith
rationale, but carefully refrained from extending its holding to encom104
pass the entire Smith decision.
The issue in Goodwin v. Oswald was whether or not prisoner-members of the Prisoners' Labor Union should be permitted to receive a letter from their attorneys, which letter contained advice about the formation of the union and efforts to have it officially certified, and all
letters from the Legal Aid Society, in accordance with the provisions
enunciated in Administrative Bulletin No. 20 of the Department of Correctional Services. The regulation requires that attorney mail be
opened in the prisoner's presence, presumably to insure that it is
10 5
checked only for contraband and not read for content.
The Second Circuit concluded that the district court was correct in
requiring the delivery of the letters and their enclosures. However, the
district court judgment had gone further and required adherence to the
existing departmental regulations. The regulations inhibit the "chilling
101.

For a good discussion of prior restraint, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697

(1931).
102.

454 F.2d 696 (ist Cir. 1972).

103.

Id. at 697.

104.

Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1245 (2d Cir. 1972).

105.

Id. at 1239, 1240.
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effect" of any procedure under which the inmate is required to trust the
members of the prison staff not to read an opened letter. The court
expressed the desirability of the policy exhibited in the regulations
(which policy is similar to the Smith v. Robbins holding) and urged
adherence to that policy; however, it determined that it was not necessary to go that far and, thus, froze the regulations in this situation on
the narrow issue of the Legal Aid letters involved. 106
Thus, it appears from the foregoing cases that the first amendment,
at a minimum, protects correspondence to the prisoner's attorney and
the courts if the mail relates to the legality of the prisoner's conviction
or the conditions of his incarceration."' The recognition of a constitutional right necessitates the courts' application of some type of first
amendment test; the courts have utilized variations of the balancing,
"less drastic means," and "clear and present danger" tests. If the mail
is to someone other than the prisoner's attorney or the courts, the
judiciary may or may not give to this correspondence the protection of
the first amendment.
Apparently, no court has held that a prisoner possesses a first
amendment right to all use of the mails. However, a recent trail-blazing district court decision, Morales v. Schmidt, indicated that the freedom to use the mails is a first amendment freedom and that, in the general population, each individual's interest in corresponding by mail is
considered a "fundamental" interest.'"" When the government denies
this freedom to convicted persons, while allowing it to the general population, the court felt that the prison must show a "compelling governmental interest in this differential in treatment."' 10 9
Morales represents a virtual attack on the prison system as an institution. If rules must be promulgated for institutional survival, and
these rules substantially affect the individual rights of the prisoners,
"the balance must be struck in favor of the individual rights of the
prisoners;" a theory was propounded whereby if prison system survival requires limitations of fundamental rights of the incarcerated, "it
may well be that the Constitution requires that the prison be modified."" 0
106. Id. at 1245.
107. Perhaps the reason for this protection is not
amendment; the Due Process Clauses of the fifth and
Assistance of Counsel Clause of the sixth amendment
tection to the prisoner.
108. 340 F. Supp. 544, 554 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
mitted between a prisoner and his paramour.
109. Id. at 554-55.
110. Id. at 554.

only the existence of the first
fourteenth amendments and the
may share in assuring this proThe correspondence was per-
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However, the Seventh Circuit, in reviewing the Morales district court
opinion, felt that the "compelling governmental interest" standard was
inapplicable and propounded that the appropriate test would involve
deciding whether the prohibition of the communication was rationally
related to the advancement of a legitimate purpose of the state such
as the rehabilitation of the prisoner; the dissent seemed to indicate that
a "less drastic means" standard would be proper."1
Freedom of Religion
There are other first amendment rights of the incarcerated which
have been the subject of much litigation. Among these are those rights
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment. Interestingly enough, the courts apparently have been able to resolve the
problems inherent in this type of litigation much more easily than the
mail problems.
Under the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment each individual is supposed to have the freedom to practice the religion of his
choice. A question exists as to whether or not an individual retains this
right once he is put behind prison walls. A fundamental determination
must be made as to what constitutes a religion before any other question can be resolved. 1" Included among those rights which a prisoner
is said to retain is an immunity from punishment for making a reasonable attempt to exercise his religion, even a religion which may seem
unusual to another."'
The United States Supreme Court in Cooper v. Pate declared that a
prisoner's complaint is valid if it alleges that, solely because of his religious beliefs, he was not permitted to purchase certain religious publications and denied other privileges which other prisoners enjoy." 4
Whatever may be the view with regard to the usual problems of prison
discipline, courts have determined that a charge of religious persecution falls in a special category since freedom of religion and of conscience is one of the fundamental "preferred" freedoms promised to all
individuals by the Constitution.1 5 Religious freedom may undergo
111. Morales v. Schmidt, Civil No. 72-1373, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1973).
112. It appears that the courts at present are prone to construe liberally what is
determined to be a religion. See Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga.
1972), but see Prison 'Religion' Nettles Officials, N.Y. Times, September 24, 1972, at
57, col. 1, for the results of the Theriault decision.
113. E.g., Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428, 431 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
988 (1966).
114. 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
115. E.g., Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1961); Weaver v. Pate,
390 F.2d 145, 146 (7th Cir. 1968).
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modification in a prison environment; however, it cannot be suppressed
or ignored without adequate reason." 16
The Third Circuit in Long v. Parker'1 7 felt that mere antipathy
caused by statements derogatory of, and offensive to, the white race
would not justify the suppression of Black Muslim religious literature
even in a prison situation. The court held that mere speculation that
such statements could ignite racial or religious riots in the prison would
not warrant their proscription. In order to justify the prohibition of
religious literature, prison authorities must prove that the literature
amounts to a "clear and present danger" of a breach of prison security
or discipline or some other substantial interference with the order required in the institution.""
It appears, nevertheless, that the Third Circuit, when applying the
"clear and present danger" test in Knuckles v. Prasse"19 engaged in
quite a bit of speculation. There the court determined that it was not
mandatory that the prison officials make available Black Muslim periodicals and books requested by the prisoners since these writings
could be interpreted as sanctioning the concept that whites generally
and prison authorities should be defied by Black Muslim prisoners even
when legal orders were made. Although the court stated that such a
view is not a correct reading of Black Muslim religious doctrine, it felt
that the literature could be subject to inferences exhorting such defiances if not interpreted by a trained Muslim minister. Thus, the literature could present a "clear and present danger" which would threaten
prison security or discipline. 2 ' However, the Eighth Circuit recently
held that the prisoner could receive the newspaper Muhammad Speaks
as long as the literature did not have a substantially inflammatory effect
2
on the inmates.' '
It has been said that the requirement that a state may not interpose
unreasonable barriers to the free exercise of religion by the inmates
does not imply that the state has a positive duty to furnish every prisoner with a clergyman or religious services of his choosing. 1 22 How116. E.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Prison authorities have also been permitted to refuse to inmates who had a history of being security risks and who were confined to a maximum security building permission to attend Sunday worship services in the prison chapel. Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966
(8th Cir. 1969).
117. 390 F.2d 816 (3rd Cir. 1968).
118. Id. at 822.
119. 435 F.2d 1255 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936, rehearing denied,
404 U.S. 877 (1971).
120. 435 F.2d at 1256.
121. Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Walker v.
Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 29 (5th Cir. 1969).
122. Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4 (3rd Cir. 1970). The court distin-
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ever, the Smith v. Blackledge" 3 decision recognized that a prisoner
might have a valid complaint that a prison was not as open to a minister of his choice as to other clergymen of various faiths. In Smith the
inmate asserted that the prison did not treat the Black Muslim minister
on an equal basis with white clergymen in that the state paid the white
ministers while it did not pay the Black Muslim minister. Therefore,
the Black Muslim minister discontinued his visits to the prison. 2 4 The
Fourth Circuit recognized that the complaint and other facts did present issues of fact as to whether any religious discrimination existed.' 25
Thus, a court will determine if a prisoner is being religiously discriminated against or if he is being denied the free exercise of his religion; if such discrimination or denial exists, the state is generally required to prove that the prisoner's exercise of his religion would constitute a "clear and present danger" if the prisoner is permitted to prevail.
In contrast to the mail correspondence cases, therefore, the courts have
recognized that freedom to exercise religion is a constitutional right of
the imprisoned.
It seems that it is beneficial for the prison if prison authorities permit liberal rules regarding the prisoners' religious rights. The Fourth
Circuit in Brown v. Peyton'2 6 recognized that religious beliefs are supposed to make an individual a more ethical, useful member of the societal setting. If one of the principal purposes of imprisonment is to effect the rehabilitation of the inmates, then it would seem all the more
important that the prisoners be allowed to practice their religious
choice. 27 Perhaps, in this area, more than in any other, there is a need
for both the courts and prison officials to tend to construe the "clear
and present danger" test in a light most favorable to the prisoner before
declaring that a prisoner has forfeited any of his religious rights under the
first amendment.
Press Interviews
An emerging controversial area of prisoner rights litigation involves
the issue of whether or not the prisoner-and the public-may enjoy a
first amendment right to interviews between the press and the prisoner.
A federal district court in Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst
guished between providing facilities for worship and the opportunity for clergy to visit
the institution and actually supplying the clergy.
123. 451 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1971).
124. Id. at 1202.
125. Id.

126.
127.

437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1230.
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struck down a blanket ban on press interviews for federal prisoners as
being unconstitutional. The court discussed the propriety of utilizing a balancing technique, weighing the governmental interests against
the limitations placed on the first amendment freedoms of the involved
parties. It held that, if it can be clearly established that serious administrative or disciplinary problems are created, the prohibition of
the press interviews would be justified.12
On appeal, Washington Post was remanded to the district court for
further consideration in light of the United States Supreme Court's
Branzburg decision, which decision compelled reporters to reveal information gathered by them to grand juries. However, on remand, the
district court stated that reconsideration only reinforced its decision that
the blanket ban on press interviews of federal inmates is unconstitutional. 12 9
On the other hand, a North Carolina federal district court in Smith
v. Bounds recently held that the exclusion of newsmen who desired to
interview inmates from the prison personally is a matter of internal
prison administration with which the court should not interfere. The
court, determining that there were too many problems of security in
personal interviews, felt that the prisoners have a sufficient amount of
contact with the media via mail.' 30
However, a New York federal district court in Burnham v. Oswald
recently held that prison inmates are to be allowed face-to-face interviews with reporters. 13 1 It was stated that a "clear and present danger"
test is applicable in such a situation, and the interview must be permitted with a consenting inmate unless it is determined that the interview poses a "clear and present danger" of breach of the security, discipline or orderly administration of the institution, or that the inmate
had clearly abused his right of access to the press previously." 2
The prisoners in Burnham argued that the failure of the prison
guidelines to provide for interviews out of the hearing of the correctional personnel permits a "chilling effect" on the exercise of first amend128. Civil No. 467-72, 11 CRIM. L. Rpm. 2045, 2046 (D.C. D.C. 1972).
129. Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 12 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2344 (D.C. D.C. 1972).
The United States Supreme Court's decision referred to is Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
For a discussion of the Branzburg decision see Comment, 4 Loy.
U.S. 665 (1972).
L.J. 227 (1973).
130. Civil No. 2914, 1 PRISON L. RPR. 144 (E.D. N.C. 1972). See also Seattle-

Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Daggett, No. 9557, 1 PRISON L. RPR. 229 (W.D. Wash.
1972).
131.
132.

342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 887.
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ment rights. However, the court felt that although the interview monitoring by the correctional personnel is permissible, the inmate interviewee may not be subjected to any sort of reprisal; retribution or retaliation because he granted the interview or because of the contents of
his interview. Also, the officials are not permitted to interrupt or interfere with the conversation between the newsman and the inmate to
comment on the conversation. 33 However, the opportunity for abuse
on the part of the prison officials is apparent since a subtle form of
harassment could take place and yet it would not be viewed as amounting to "retribution" or "retaliation."
Perhaps forthcoming decisions will shed some light on the direction in
which the courts plan to go when faced with the press interview-inmate
problem. Not only are the prisoners' first amendment rights at stake but
also the public's right to know is involved. If the Burnham "clear and
present danger" test is sanctioned, a great judicial step forward will be
taken in the recognition of prisoner rights in the first amendment area.
However, if the courts lean toward Smith v. Bounds, once again the
judiciary will be shifting the burden, as it has done in many first amendment cases via its "hands off' policy, to the prison officials. If the
courts decide to permit the limitation on press interviews, they will
no doubt be opening wide the doors to extensive future litigation
-litigation brought both on behalf of the prisoners and the representatives of the news media.
The Unconvicted Prisoner
Thus far this discussion has been mostly concerned with the prisoner
who has been tried, found guilty and sentenced to serve a term in prison. However, not all prisoners are ever proven to be guilty. Numerous people are behind bars, awaiting trial, solely because they could not
afford bail. Thus, the economically underprivileged person must begin serving time in prison simply because he is financially less fortunate
34
than his free-and perhaps as "guilty"-wealthy counterpart.
The past few years have revealed a more progressive judicial attitude
toward the unconvicted prisoner than was previously prevalent.'3 5 In
133. Id. at 889.
134. "It has been estimated that 40 percent or more of the jail population is made
up of unconvicted defendants. A large proportion of these, from 40 to 60 percent, will
later be released without being convicted." MORRIS AND HAWKINS, THE HONEST
POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 113 (1970).

135.

See Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo. 1968), for an indication

of the attitude toward the unconvicted prisoner just a few years ago.
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Palmigiano v. Travisono... unconvicted prisoners contended that the
prison officials persisted in opening, reading and censoring the prisoners' incoming and outgoing mail, including correspondence with courts,
officials of the government and attorneys. They asserted that these actions of the prison officials constituted a "chilling effect" upon their right
to court access, their right to petition representatives of government,
and their right to effective representation by counsel.' 3 7
The Palmigiano court, carefully stating that its opinion related only
to letters,' 3 8 decided that the prison officials could not open or otherwise inspect the contents of any incoming or outgoing letters between
inmates and various public officials and inmates and any attorney duly
licensed to practice law in Rhode Island. 1 9 Letters addressed to an inmate from his approved addressee list could be inspected but not read.
All other incoming mail, except that received from public officials,
Rhode Island attorneys, or approved addressee list members, could be
read and inspected in an effort to keep from the prison anything which
In regard to
threatens the safety and/or security of the prison."'
outgoing mail the court held that the reading of any such mail is not
necessary and constitutes a violation of the inmates' first amendment
rights, unless such reading is pursuant to a duly obtained search warwarrant]
rant, "and in the absence of the same [a duly obtained search
14
no outgoing prisoner mail may be opened, read or inspected.' '
Following this trend, an Ohio federal district court in Jones v. Wittenberg recently made a distinction between prisoners serving sentences and those who are awaiting trial.' 4 ' It was determined that
prisoners who are serving sentences are properly subject to some limitations on communication, to the extent that this may be a desirable type
of punishment. However, prisoners who are awaiting trial should not
be subjected to any punishment, except to the extent necessary to keep
prison order. In other words, prisoners who are unconvicted can be
limited in their communications with the outside world only to the extent necessary to prevent abuse, or as a means of general enforcement
of discipline. In so holding, the court announced, among other standards, the following guidelines with respect to unconvicted prisoners:
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
Id. at 780.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 788-89.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 791.

142. 330 F. Supp. 707, 719 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
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1. There shall be no censorship of outgoing mail.
2. There shall be no limitation on the persons to whom outgoing mail may be directed.
3. There shall be no censorship of incoming letters from the
prisoner's attorney, or from any judge or elected public official.
4. Incoming parcels or letters may be inspected for contraband,
but letters may not be read.
5. Proper arrangements shall be made to insure that prisoners
may freely obtain writing materials and postage.
6. Indigent prisoners shall be furnished at public expense writing materials and ordinary postage for their personal
use in
14 3
dispatching a maximum of five (5) letters per week.
The Jones court felt that standards 2 and 4 need not be applied to convicted prisoners and that reasonable limitations could be placed upon
144
the number of dispatched letters.
The Jones guidelines extended the Palmigiano rights since in Palmigiano some incoming correspondence could be read but no incoming
letters could be read in Jones.
A federal district court in Connecticut in Seale v. Manson145 recently proffered what could be an acceptable test to apply when deciding
the rights of an unconvicted prisoner. After pointing out the maxim
that unconvicted detainees are those "whom the law presumes inno.
cent," the court indicated that the state's sole asserted interest is to insure the unconvicted prisoner's appearance at trial. Thus, any limitation on the fundamental rights of unconvicted prisoners must be justified in the legitimate advancement of that interest. It was held that unconvicted detainees may be treated the same as convicts only to the extent necessary to insure the security, internal order, health and discipline
of the prison; considerations of rehabilitation, deterrence or punitive
measures are immaterial. 1 6 Unfortunately, however, the decision in
Seale reflects a very conservative opinion of which rights the prisoner
7
should be free to enjoy.14
Faced with a complaint which alleged official delay, censorship and
reading of an unconvicted prisoner's incoming mail from his attorney
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971).
146. Id. at 1379.
147. The court decided that "Unfettered mail and visitation privileges will seriously hamper prison security and discipline. Limiting contact with the outside community to attorneys and members of the family is not unreasonable." Id. at 1383.
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and religious advisors, the Eighth Circuit indicated that a balancing
test was adequate; the court felt that the asserted need for regulation in
the furtherance of prison security or orderly administration must be
weighed against the claimed constitutional rights and the extent to
which they had been impaired.' 48
It seems that, particularly in the case of the unconvicted prisoner, a
court should do everything possible to insure the "presumably innocent" individual the full range of his first amendment rights. If a balancing test is deemed pertinent, the balance should almost always be
struck in the prisoner's favor, giving the incarcerated the full benefit
of the "preferred" aspect of his constitutional rights; if the Seale test is
utilized, a strict construction of what is necessary to insure the security
and discipline of the prison should be propounded. The Morales.4
district court's "compelling governmental interest" test seems especially
applicable for the unconvicted prisoner and perhaps represents the ideal
posture. The unconvicted detainee, for the most part, is being economically discriminated against by the mere fact of his incarceration
(since it is usually only the poor who cannot raise bail); it seems that
the injustice already being perpetrated upon him should not be compounded by a limitation of his first amendment freedoms.
CONCLUSION

Obviously, the foregoing analysis was not designed to cover all aspects of the first amendment. Several decisions and attitudes were discussed in an attempt to determine which rights the prisoners do in fact
retaini.
It seems that, in light of the fact that the purported purpose of the
prison system is rehabilitation and deterrence-not punishment-there
is no reason why the incarcerated individual should not be as free as
anyone else to enjoy his constitutional rights. As far as those rights
given by the first amendment are concerned, the determinative test
should be the same for all people, both imprisoned and free.
A good argument can be propounded for not rendering the prisoner
the full benefit of the Brandenburg rationale; perhaps the prison environment is such that to restrict first amendment rights only when
"lawless" action is "imminent" might be the cause of serious harm both
to the prisoner and to the prison officials. However, this argument
148.
149.
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fails if the Brandenburgtest is perceived as somewhat analogous to what
was originally meant by the "clear and present danger" test; if Brandenburg is viewed in this manner, perhaps rendering to the prisoner
the full ambit of his rights, via Brandenburg, would prove feasible. A
better way of phrasing it might be to say that the prisoner should be
free to enjoy his rights subject to the Brandenburg test "under the circumstances of confinement." In other words, what could be equated
to a "clear and present danger" or to "imminent lawless action" outside the prison is not necessarily the same as what would prove "dangerous" or "imminently lawless" inside the prison walls. There is nothing revolutionary about enacting an objective standard and applying it
subjectively to the particular circumstances involved. If a very strong
argument can be devised for giving the convicted prisoner his rights
subject to the Brandenburg test, certainly there is no reason for holding
the unconvicted prisoner to any different standard than the one utilized
for the non-prisoner.
Judge Doyle, in the Morales district court's opinion, noted that court
decisions in constitutional litigation involving prisons represent an unsatisfactory method of meeting the problems posed by the existence of
prisons. 1' 5 His attitude toward the prison institution may well predict
the optimum course for the future:
Specifically, if the functions of deterrence and rehabilitation cannot be performed in a prison without the imposition of a restrictive regime not reasonably related to those functions, it may well
be that those functions can no longer be performed constitutionally in a prison setting. Also, with respect to the comparatively
few offenders who simply must be physically restrained for periods of time to prevent them from committing antisocial acts, it
may well be that the society will be compelled, constitutionally, to
allocate sufficient resources for physical facilities and manpower
to permit this function of physical restraint to be performed in a
setting which little resembles today's prisons. 5 1
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